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OPINION OF THE COURT 
  
 
 
Fuentes, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Richard Bolmer filed suit against the property 
managers of Connolly Properties, Inc., alleging that they 
conspired to harbor illegal aliens and to encourage or induce 
illegal aliens to reside in the United States in violation of 
federal law.  As a result of the Property Managers‟ conduct, 
Bolmer claims his apartment complex fell into disrepair, 
defects and violations were no longer fixed, common areas 
were rarely cleaned, and criminal activity went unreported.  
Thus, he says he suffered injury to his leasehold property.  
The District Court granted the Property Managers‟ Motion to 
Dismiss, holding that Bolmer failed to state a claim upon 
which relief could be granted, and he now appeals.  For the 
reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
A. 
 
 Mr. Bolmer has resided in the Pingry Arms building in 
Plainfield, New Jersey since February 2004.  At some point 
after he moved in, the apartment building came under the 
management of Connolly Properties.
1
  Bolmer alleges that, 
                                              
1
 The date when this change in management occurred is not 
revealed in the record. 
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after Connolly Properties began managing his building, the 
apartment complex fell into disrepair.  Specifically, he claims 
that Connolly Properties provided inadequate heat; failed to 
repair locks, his air conditioner, and the roof; failed to 
regularly clean common areas; allowed the building to 
become infested with bugs and rodents; permitted 
overcrowding, flooding, and mold; and turned a blind eye to 
criminal activity on the premises. 
 
 Bolmer asserts that, no later than January 2006, the 
Property Managers developed a scheme wherein they actively 
sought out aliens lacking lawful immigration status as 
prospective tenants.  They did so, he says, by hiring a 
Spanish-speaking leasing agent and directing her to handwrite 
flyers in Spanish to advertise vacancies.  Bolmer claims that 
the Property Managers told the leasing agent to ask all 
Spanish-speaking prospective tenants whether they were in 
this country lawfully and to exempt any aliens not lawfully 
present from the normal requirements of presenting 
identification and submitting to commercial background 
screenings.  According to Bolmer, the Property Managers 
specifically sought out these individuals as tenants because 
they believed that they were less likely to complain about 
poor housing conditions or to report housing code violations 
to the authorities.  He maintains that, by renting a substantial 
number of apartments to aliens not lawfully present, the 
Property Managers were able to allow their buildings to 
deteriorate into “slum-like conditions” without offering their 
tenants any reduction in rent.  Bolmer further asserts that the 
Property Managers segregated those tenants whom they 
believed to lack lawful immigration status into particular 
buildings “to avoid their detection by law enforcement and 
other officials.”   Appellant‟s Br. 16.  He maintains that the 
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Property Managers “acted on a belief that „mixing‟ a largely 
Hispanic illegal alien tenant population among African-
American citizen tenants would provoke disturbances and 
fights caused by animus between citizens and illegal aliens, 
and result in entry by law enforcement officer [sic] onto the 
premises to conduct investigations and arrests.”  Id. at 17. 
 
B. 
 
Plaintiffs filed this suit in June 2008 and subsequently 
amended their complaint twice, filing their Second Amended 
Complaint in December 2008.  In Count I, Bolmer alleged 
that the Property Managers violated the conspiracy provision 
of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d).  Specifically, he claimed that 
the Property Managers entered into a conspiracy to engage in 
an “Illegal Alien Rental Scheme” by renting apartments to 
aliens not lawfully present under the theory that they were 
less likely to complain about their housing conditions (or to 
demand a rent reduction in light of those conditions).  The 
alleged result of this conspiracy was to deny Bolmer and 
other lawful tenants the full value of their leasehold by 
enabling the Property Managers to keep the apartment 
complex in poor condition without reducing rents.   
 
 The Property Managers filed a Motion to Dismiss 
Count I under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  The 
District Court granted their motion, dismissing Count I with 
prejudice and denying Bolmer‟s Motion for Leave to File a 
Third Amended Complaint.  The District Court held that 
Bolmer failed to allege the predicate act of harboring and that 
he therefore failed to state a RICO conspiracy claim upon 
which relief could be granted.  Bolmer filed a Motion for 
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Reconsideration, which the District Court denied.  Bolmer 
then filed a motion for partial final judgment on the District 
Court‟s April and September Orders, pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 54(b), which the Court granted. 
 
Bolmer now appeals the District Court‟s decision.2 
 
II. 
 
 We exercise plenary review over the District Court‟s 
grant of defendants‟ motion to dismiss.  Warren Gen. Hosp. 
v. Amgen, Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 83 (3d Cir. 2011).  “In reviewing 
a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 
„we accept all factual allegations as true [and] construe the 
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.‟”  Id. at 
84 (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 
374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)).  A motion to dismiss pursuant to 
12(b)(6) may be granted “only if, accepting all well-pleaded 
allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds that 
plaintiff‟s claims lack facial plausibility.”  Id.  (citing Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)).  
Though a complaint “does not need detailed factual 
allegations, . . . a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 
cause of action will not do.”  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 
 
 On appeal, Bolmer argues that the District Court erred 
in finding that he failed to allege a pattern of racketeering 
activity.  Bolmer argues that he adequately pled two RICO 
                                              
2
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1331.  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.   
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predicate acts.  First, he asserts that the Property Managers 
violated 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), which prohibits a 
person from “conceal[ing], harbor[ing], or shield[ing] from 
detection, or attempt[ing] to conceal, harbor, or shield from 
detection” an alien who has illegally entered or remained in 
the United States, “in any place, including any building or 
any means of transportation.”   Second, Bolmer asserts that 
the Property Managers violated 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), 
which prohibits a person from “encourag[ing] or induc[ing] 
an alien to . . . reside in the United States, knowing or in 
reckless disregard of the fact that such . . . residence is or will 
be in violation of law.”  We address each of these arguments 
in turn. 
 
A. 
 
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) a person is 
criminally liable if she,  
 
knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that 
an alien has come to, entered, or remains in the 
United States in violation of law, conceals, 
harbors, or shields from detection, or attempts 
to conceal, harbor, or shield from detection, 
such alien in any place, including any building 
or means of transportation. 
 
We first addressed the question of what conduct constitutes 
the crime of harboring in United States v. Ozcelik, 527 F.3d 
88 (3d Cir. 2008).  In that case, Hakan Ozcelik was charged 
with harboring after he gave general advice to “stay low” to 
an individual whom he knew to be in the United States 
illegally.  Ozcelik, 527 F.3d at 97.  We reversed Ozcelik‟s 
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harboring conviction, holding that “the terms „shielding,‟ 
„harboring,‟ and „concealing‟ under § 1324 encompass 
conduct „tending to substantially facilitate an alien‟s 
remaining in the United States illegally‟ and to prevent 
government authorities from detecting the alien‟s unlawful 
presence.”  Id. (quoting United States v. Rubino-Gonzalez, 
674 F.2d 1067, 1073 (5th Cir. 1982)).  We added that 
“[h]olding Ozcelik criminally responsible for passing along 
general information to an illegal alien would effectively write 
the word „substantially‟ out of the test we have undertaken to 
apply.”  Id. at 101.   
 
 We have since reaffirmed our commitment to the test 
laid out in Ozcelik.  See United States v. Cuevas-Reyes, 572 
F.3d 119 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. Silveus, 542 F.3d 
993, 1003 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting that “cohabitation with [an 
alien lacking lawful immigration status], taken alone, does 
not constitute „harboring‟ within the meaning of the statute”).  
Moreover, in Lozano v. City of Hazleton, we specifically 
noted that  
 
“harboring” requires some act of obstruction 
that reduces the likelihood the government will 
discover the alien‟s presence.  It is highly 
unlikely that a landlord’s renting of an 
apartment to an alien lacking lawful 
immigration status could ever, without more, 
satisfy this definition of harboring.  Renting an 
apartment in the normal course of business is 
not in and of itself conduct that prevents the 
government from detecting an alien‟s presence. 
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Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 223 (3d Cir. 2010), 
vacated on other grounds, City of Hazleton v. Lozano, 180 L. 
Ed. 2d 243 (2011) (emphasis added).
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Thus, to the extent that they simply rented apartments to 
aliens not lawfully present, the Property Managers cannot be 
said to have committed the crime of harboring. 
 
Bolmer argues that the the Property Managers did 
“much more than merely rent[]” apartments to undocumented 
individuals in that they “set up a criminal scheme which (1) 
specifically targeted illegal aliens as prospective tenants . . . 
and (2) which steered illegal aliens into certain properties for 
the express purpose of preventing authorities from detecting 
the presence of illegal aliens on their properties.”  Appellant‟s 
Br. 8.  In support of his claim that this conduct constitutes 
harboring, Bolmer directs our attention to cases from our 
sister circuits that have found harboring violations.  Indeed, 
other circuits (some of which have defined “harboring” more 
broadly than we have in Ozcelik and other cases) have found 
defendants to be guilty of harboring in a variety of situations.  
                                              
3
 While the Supreme Court recently vacated Lozano and 
remanded it to this Court for further consideration in light of 
its opinion in Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 
1968 (2011), Lozano‟s reasoning regarding harboring still 
provides us with useful direction.  Whiting dealt with the 
question of whether federal law preempts an Arizona state 
law that authorized the state to impose licensing sanctions on 
employers that hire undocumented individuals.  2011 U.S. 
LEXIS at *12.  Whiting did not address the question of what 
conduct constitutes harboring, nor did it disturb this Court‟s 
reasoning on that point. 
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See, e.g., Edwards v. Prime Inc., 602 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 
2010) (holding that defendants engaged in harboring where 
they knowingly employed undocumented individuals, 
provided them with false names and Social Security numbers, 
and paid them in cash); United States v. Xiang Hui Ye, 588 
F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that defendant was guilty of 
harboring where he employed individuals he knew were 
undocumented, did not require them to fill out job 
applications, tax forms, or other employment documents, 
leased apartments for them, paid them in cash, advised them 
that they could purchase fake immigration documents in 
Chicago, and omitted them from state employment forms); 
United States v. Singh, 261 F.3d 530 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting 
that defendant may have been guilty of harboring where he 
employed undocumented individuals in his convenience store 
and those individuals lived in a back room of the store); 
United States v. Sanchez, 927 F.2d 376, 379 (8th Cir. 1991) 
(holding that defendant was guilty of harboring where she and 
her husband “met with illegal aliens; the aliens told Mr. 
Sanchez that they were illegal; Mr. Sanchez told the illegal 
aliens that he could provide immigration papers for them; Mr. 
Sanchez paid to rent an apartment for the illegal aliens; Mrs. 
Sanchez took the illegal aliens to an apartment paid for by 
Mr. Sanchez; and Mrs. Sanchez told an illegal alien that she 
would give him a paper that would permit him to work”). 
 
These cases, however, all involved defendants who 
failed to make necessary state and federal employment-
related disclosures, were involved in smuggling 
undocumented individuals into this country, attempted to 
warn undocumented individuals of the presence of law 
enforcement authorities, and/or provided specific assistance 
in obtaining false documents.  Here, the Property Managers 
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were not required to disclose their tenants‟ identities or 
immigration status to federal or state authorities, nor did they 
bring their tenants into this country, offer them assistance in 
procuring false documents, impede a law enforcement 
investigation, or pay to rent apartments on their behalf so as 
to keep their names off of the leases.  We do not know of any 
court of appeals that has held that knowingly renting an 
apartment to an alien lacking lawful immigration status 
constitutes harboring.  Indeed, we believe that such a holding 
would be contrary to our prior opinion in Ozcelik, because 
such conduct does not constitute the type of “substantial 
facilitation” that we require to make out a harboring offense. 
 
  Moreover, even assuming we were to find that the 
Property Managers substantially facilitated such aliens 
remaining in the United States, the Ozcelik test also requires 
Bolmer to show that their conduct tended to “prevent 
government authorities from detecting the alien‟s unlawful 
presence.”  Ozcelik, 527 F.3d at 100.  He has not alleged facts 
that show such conduct.  The two specific acts that Bolmer 
suggests constituted “acts of obstruction” were 1) exempting 
aliens not lawfully present from background checks and 2) 
segregating them into specific rental buildings.  However, 
these actions did not actually hinder immigration authorities‟ 
detection of undocumented tenants.  First, landlords have no 
obligation to require background checks of their tenants, so 
the Property Managers did not evade any federal or state 
reporting requirements.  Moreover, Bolmer did not allege that 
third party background check screeners could or would have 
determined rental applicants‟ immigration status or that they 
would have passed such status information along to 
immigration authorities.  Second, by grouping large numbers 
of undocumented individuals into specific apartment 
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buildings, the Property Managers arguably made the 
undocumented population more conspicuous, both to Bolmer 
and to the authorities.  Bolmer noted that, “[b]efore CPI 
began managing the Pingry Arms property, mostly African-
American and Caucasian tenants resided at the property.  
During CPI‟s management of Pingry Arms, [he] . . . observed 
the evolution of the tenants to majority Hispanic, and few 
speak English [sic].”  Pl.‟s SAC ¶¶ 70-71.  He describes his 
building today as an “illegal alien slum,” id. ¶ 73, and it is 
clear that he found his allegedly undocumented alien 
neighbors to be more visible as they increased in number.   
 
While Bolmer has plausibly asserted that the Property 
Managers sought to conceal their own violations of local 
housing code and of federal prohibitions against 
discrimination in housing, he has not shown that they did 
anything to prevent their undocumented residents from being 
apprehended by immigration authorities.  Certainly, as in 
Ozcelik, the Property Managers were likely aware that some 
of their residents lacked lawful immigration status and did 
nothing to alert federal authorities to this fact.  The picture 
Bolmer paints, however, is one of a company whose 
leadership cared little of what happened to its tenants so long 
as Connolly Properties received a steady stream of rental 
income from any source.  Bolmer has alleged that the 
Property Managers engaged in a great deal of unsavory and 
possibly discriminatory behavior.  However, he has not 
sufficiently alleged that their conduct “„tend[ed] to 
substantially facilitate an alien‟s remaining in the United 
States illegally‟ and to prevent government authorities from 
detecting the alien‟s unlawful presence.”  Ozcelik, 527 F.3d at 
100.  Thus, the District Court properly dismissed his 
harboring claim. 
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B. 
 
Bolmer also asserts that the Property Managers 
violated 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), which penalizes a 
person who “encourages or induces an alien to come to, enter, 
or reside in the United States, knowing or in reckless 
disregard of the fact that such coming to, entry, or residence 
is or will be in violation of law.”  As described above, in 
order to make out a claim for harboring in our circuit, it must 
be shown that the alleged violator “substantially facilitated” 
an alien not lawfully present remaining in the United States.  
Similarly, we believe that encouragement or inducement must 
also be “substantial” to support a conviction under the statute.  
This means not just general advice (as the Ozcelik defendant 
provided) but some affirmative assistance that makes an alien 
lacking lawful immigration status more likely to enter or 
remain in the United States than she otherwise might have 
been.  “Induce” is defined as “to move by persuasion or 
influence; to call forth or bring about by influence or 
stimulation; to cause the formation of; or to produce,” 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY,  available at 
www.merriam-webster.com, and that word plainly refers to 
conduct that causes someone to do something that they might 
otherwise not do.  Moreover, “[t]he ordinary and common 
sense meaning of „encourage‟ implies an affirmative act that 
serves as a catalyst or trigger that drives, motivates, or spurs 
another individual to embark on a course of action that he 
might not have otherwise.”  United States v. Lopez, 590 F.3d 
1238, 1259 (11th Cir. 2009) (Barkett, J., dissenting).  Thus, 
“encourage” is best defined as “„[t]o instigate; to incite to 
action; to give courage to; to inspirit; to embolden; to raise 
confidence; to make confident.‟” Id. (quoting BLACK‟S LAW 
DICTIONARY 620 (4th ed. 1968)).  These definitions 
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demonstrate that the word “encourage,” in the context of this 
statute, also refers to conduct that causes someone to do 
something that they otherwise might not do. 
 
 Indeed, reading the encouraging or inducing 
subsection of the statute too broadly risks rendering the 
remaining subsections of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A) redundant 
or superfluous.  Subsection (i) prohibits bringing an alien 
lacking lawful immigration status to the United States other 
than at a designated port of entry.  Subsection (ii) prohibits 
transporting such an alien within the United States in 
furtherance of their illegal presence in this country.  Finally, 
subsection (iii), which we have already discussed at length, 
prohibits harboring an alien not lawfully present.  If we define 
“encourage” merely as “to help,” then the particular conduct 
that is prohibited in subsections (i)-(iii) is subsumed by the 
general prohibition against helping an undocumented person 
to “come to, enter, or reside in” the United States in 
subsection (iv).  “It is a well known canon of statutory 
construction that courts should construe statutory language to 
avoid interpretations that would render any phrase 
superfluous.”  United States v. Cooper, 396 F.3d 308, 312 (3d 
Cir. 2005); see also Lopez, 590 F.3d at 1259  (“„A basic 
premise of statutory construction is that a statute is to be 
interpreted so that no words shall be discarded as being 
meaningless, redundant, or mere surplusage.‟” (quoting 
United States v. Canals-Jimenez, 943 F.2d 1284, 1287 (11th 
Cir. 1991))).  Accordingly, we read subsection (iv) as 
prohibiting a person from engaging in an affirmative act that 
substantially encourages or induces an alien lacking lawful 
immigration status to come to, enter, or reside in the United 
States where the undocumented person otherwise might not 
have done so.  Thus, subsection (iv) has the distinct character 
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of foreclosing the type of substantial assistance that will spur 
a person to commit a violation of immigration law where they 
otherwise might not have.   
 
The Property Managers in this case did not engage in 
an affirmative act that served as a catalyst for aliens to reside 
in the United States in violation of immigration law when 
they might not have otherwise.  Bolmer suggests that the 
Property Managers provided aliens not lawfully present with 
rental housing, which other companies would not do, thereby 
encouraging them to reside in the United States when they 
otherwise might not have.  However, Bolmer did not allege 
that these aliens would not or could not have resided in the 
United States without renting apartments in Connolly 
Properties‟ buildings.  Nor, given the facts of this case, would 
such an assertion have been facially plausible, as the motion 
to dismiss standard requires.  See Warren Hosp. v. Amgen, 
Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 83 (3d Cir. 2011).  Among other things, 
many aliens are eligible for federal public housing benefits 
even if they live in households in which some members are 
aliens not lawfully present.  See ALISON SISKIN & MAGGIE 
MCCARTY, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 
IMMIGRATION: NONCITIZEN ELIGIBILITY FOR NEEDS-BASED 
HOUSING PROGRAMS (2008).  This suggests that aliens 
lacking lawful immigration status are able to reside in this 
country with or without the assistance of the Property 
Managers‟ alleged rental scheme.  Moreover, there is no legal 
requirement that apartment managers screen potential tenants 
based on immigration status, and in some places it is actually 
illegal to do so.  See Note, “There Be No Shelter Here”: Anti-
Immigrant Housing Ordinances and Comprehensive Reform, 
20 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL‟Y 399, (2010) (“California, for 
example [has] enact[ed] legislation barring landlords from 
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asking tenants their legal status . . . .  New York City also has 
an ordinance prohibiting landlords from questioning tenants 
about their legal status or discriminating against them based 
on alienage or citizenship.”).  Thus, Bolmer cannot show that 
the Property Managers‟ conduct incited aliens to remain in 
this country unlawfully when they otherwise might not have 
done so, and he therefore has not alleged that they engaged in 
conduct sufficient to constitute encouraging or inducing.   
 
We recognize that some of our sister circuits have 
chosen to define “encouraging or inducing” more broadly 
than we do here.  See Edwards, 602 F.3d at 1295 (affirming a 
conviction for encouraging or inducing where the defendants 
hired and actively sought out individuals known to be 
undocumented and also provided them with names and social 
security numbers to facilitate their illegal employment); 
Lopez, 590 F.3d at 1249-52 (defining “encouraging or 
inducing” to include the act of “helping” aliens come to, 
enter, or remain in the United States and upholding Lopez‟s 
conviction for encouraging or inducing where he captained a 
boat to the Bahamas, refueled it, spent the night, picked up 
aliens who lacked lawful immigration status from a hotel, and 
then drove them toward the United States in the boat); United 
States v. Fujii, 301 F.3d 535, 540 (7th Cir. 2002) (“To prove 
that Fujii „encouraged or induced‟ the aliens, all that the 
government needed to establish was that Fujii knowingly 
helped or advised the aliens.”).  Nevertheless, while setting a 
seemingly low bar (i.e. “to help”) these cases have found that 
encouraging or inducing occurred only where defendants 
were personally involved in bringing aliens lacking lawful 
immigration status into the United States.  The defendant in 
Fujii, for example, accompanied such aliens on their trip to 
the United States, while the Lopez defendant conveyed aliens 
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toward the Untied States via boat.  Thus, we are not 
convinced that these circuits would agree that giving any type 
of “help” to an alien not lawfully present, no matter how de 
minimis the assistance, constitutes the crime of encouraging 
or inducing. 
 
Moreover, defining the conduct at issue in this case as 
encouraging or inducing runs the risk of criminalizing actions 
contemplated by federal law and undermining the federal 
system of immigration enforcement.  Persons who currently 
lack lawful immigration status may nonetheless reside in the 
United States, often with the explicit knowledge or even 
permission of the federal government.  See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 
1158 (authorizing the grant of asylum to refugees who are 
fleeing persecution abroad);  8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) (allowing 
aliens to adjust their status to lawful permanent resident);  8 
U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (providing relief from deportation to 
certain persons otherwise subject to removal); 8 C.F.R. § 
244.2 (granting certain aliens temporary protected status); 8 
C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(8)-(11), (14) (defining categories of 
aliens lacking lawful immigration status who are eligible to 
receive an employment authorization document).  We cannot 
imagine that Congress contemplated that our nation‟s 
landlords (not to mention our hotel and motel operators, 
innkeepers, and others who are in the business of providing 
accommodations) would be tasked with making complex 
legal determinations about who is permitted to live in this 
country, much less that they would be criminalized for an 
error in so doing.  Thus, we believe that our interpretation of 
the encouraging and inducing statute best comports with the 
larger scheme of federal immigration law. 
 
III. 
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Bolmer also argues that the District Court abused its 
discretion by refusing to allow him to amend his complaint 
for a third time in order to plead additional facts that would 
demonstrate that the Property Managers prevented their 
undocumented residents from being detected by law 
enforcement.  He relies on Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229 (3d 
Cir. 2004), for the proposition that, “even when a plaintiff 
does not expressly seek leave to amend, „if a claim is 
vulnerable to a 12(b)(6) dismissal, the court must give the 
party an opportunity to amend its pleadings unless such 
amendment would be futile or the party has expressed his 
intent to stand on his pleadings.‟”  Appellant‟s Br. 48 
(quoting Alston, 363 F.3d at 236).  Alston, however, was 
given no opportunity whatsoever to amend his complaint, 
while Bolmer amended his complaint twice.  Alston, 363 F.3d 
at 234 n.7.  Moreover, Alston‟s was a civil rights complaint.  
“In non-civil rights cases, the settled rule is that properly 
requesting leave to amend a complaint requires submitting a 
draft amended complaint.”  Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote 
Concrete Contrs., Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 252-53 (3d Cir. 2007).  
Bolmer never presented a draft of a third amended complaint 
to the District Court.  This failure is fatal to his request.   
 
Bolmer argues that he did inform the District Court of 
additional facts that he wished to allege.  Although a district 
court is authorized to grant a plaintiff leave to amend a 
complaint when justice so requires, it is not compelled to do 
so when amendment would be futile.  Shane v. Fauver, 213 
F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000).  Here, the District Court found 
that further amendment of the complaint would have been 
futile.  Our independent review of the record confirms that the 
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District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bolmer 
leave to amend his complaint a third time. 
 
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court=s dismissal of Bolmer‟s claim.4 
 
 
                                              
4
 Because it found that Bolmer did not allege facts sufficient 
to constitute the predicate acts of harboring or encouraging or 
inducing, the District Court did not reach the issue of whether 
Bolmer had standing to bring a RICO claim.  Bolmer v. 
Connolly Properties, Inc., No. 08-2753, slip op. at 6 n.2 
(D.N.J.  April 8, 2009).  For the same reason, we also decline 
to address this issue. 
1 
 
McKee, Chief Judge, concurring.  
Although I join my colleagues‘ analysis in its entirety, 
I write separately to highlight problems inherent in the text of 
the Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act 
(―RICO‖) that are exemplified by this complaint.  My 
concern arises from the fact that the treble damage provision 
of RICO spawns claims that are not at all related to the 
congressional purpose underlying that statute.  Although 
many have recognized this problem, Congress has yet to 
address it.  I nevertheless remain hopeful that continued calls 
for a legislative response to problems endemic in RICO‘s 
civil damage provision will one day alert Congress to the 
need to restrict the statute to the ills Congress thought it was 
addressing when it enacted this far reaching legislation. 
I. 
―RICO was an aggressive initiative to supplement old 
remedies and develop new methods for fighting crime.‖  
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 498 (1985) 
(citation omitted). 
                                              
 Judges Fuentes and Greenberg join Chief Judge McKee in 
this concurring opinion. 
2 
 
As is clear from my colleagues‘ explanation of this 
Amended Complaint, this case is at once a landlord-tenant 
dispute, a nuisance claim, and an alleged conspiracy to 
unlawfully rent apartments to undocumented persons.  Those 
allegations are a far cry from what Congress intended when it 
added certain immigration violations to the already expansive 
list of predicate acts that would support a civil RICO claim.   
Bolmer rests his RICO claim solely upon alleged 
violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act (―INA‖). 
RICO was amended to define ―racketeering activity‖ to 
include: ―any act which is indictable under the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, section 274 (relating to bringing in and 
harboring certain aliens) . . . .‖  18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(F) 
(2006).   Section 274, which is now a RICO predicate 
offense, prohibits the bringing in, transportation, harboring, or 
employment of undocumented aliens.  8 U.S.C. § 1324 
(2006).  ―[A] violation of § 274 of the INA is one of the 
infrequently used ‗racketeering acts‘ identified in RICO § 
1961(1).‖  Paul Batista, Civil RICO Practice Manual, § 3.15 
(3d ed. Supp. 2010).  As my colleagues explain, harboring 
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and encouraging or inducing—the alleged predicate acts 
here—are ill-defined under the INA itself.  
It is, nevertheless, clear that Congress did extend 
RICO‘s predicate offenses to include specified immigration 
violations when it enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (―AEDPA‖).  Pub. L. No. 104-
132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).  In fact, § 433 of AEDPA is 
entitled: ―Establishing Certain Alien Smuggling-Related 
Crimes as RICO-Predicate Offenses.‖  Those ―RICO 
Amendments‖ primarily focus on unlawful assistance to 
undocumented persons entering the country and those who 
help them evade law enforcement while here.
1
 
                                              
1
 See AEDPA § 433.   
 
Establishing Certain Alien Smuggling-Related Crimes 
as RICO-Predicate Offenses:  Section 1961(1) of title 
18, United States Code, is amended— 
(1) by inserting ―section 1028 (relating to fraud and 
related activity in connection with identification 
documents) if the act indictable under section 1028 
was committed for the purpose of financial gain,‖ 
before ―section 1029‖; 
(2) by inserting ―section 1542 (relating to false 
statement in application and use of passport) if the act 
indictable under section 1542 was committed for the 
purpose of financial gain, section 1543 (relating to 
forgery or false use of passport) if the act indictable 
under section 1543 was committed for the purpose of 
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Congressional concern with smuggling organizations 
is evident in the text, history, and purpose of the AEDPA 
amendments to RICO.  The House Committee Report on 
AEDPA explains:  
The bill adds a number of immigration-related 
offenses as predicate offenses under the Racketeer 
Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (―RICO‖).  The 
RICO statute is among the principal tools that Federal 
law enforcement officials use to combat organized 
crime.  The amendment made by this section will 
extend the definition of ―predicate acts‖ to enable them 
to use the statute to combat alien smuggling 
organizations.   
H.R. Rep. No. 104-22 (1995), 1995 WL 56411 at *6 
(emphasis added).  Predicate acts established by AEDPA thus 
                                                                                                     
financial gain, section 1544 (relating to misuse of 
passport) if the act indictable under section 1544 was 
committed for the purpose of financial gain, section 
1546 (relating to fraud and misuse of visas, permits, 
and other documents) if the act indictable under 
section 1546 was committed for the purpose of 
financial gain, sections 1581–1588 (relating to 
peonage and slavery),‖ after ―section 1513 (relating to 
retaliating against a witness, victim, or an 
informant),‖; 
(3) by striking ―or‖ before ―(E)‖; and 
(4) by inserting before the period at the end the 
following: ―, or (F) any act which is indictable under 
the Immigration and Nationality Act, section 274 
(relating to bringing in and harboring certain aliens), 
section 277 (relating to aiding or assisting certain 
aliens to enter the United States), or section 278 
(relating to importation of alien for immoral purpose) 
if the act indictable under such section of such Act was 
committed for the purpose of financial gain[.]‖. 
5 
 
reflect Congress‘ desire to include smuggling ―organizations‖ 
within RICO‘s grasp.  The amendments focus on the kind of 
activity such organizations engage in to smuggle aliens into 
the country.  ―The offenses added as RICO predicate act[s] 
are offenses involving fraud, false use, or forgery of 
passports, identification documents, or visas; offenses relating 
to peonage and slavery; offenses relating to retaliation against 
a witness, victim, or an information; and offenses relating to 
assisting illegal aliens to enter the country.‖  Id. at *16.   
Thus, including certain immigration violations as 
predicate acts under RICO ―enable[d] federal law 
enforcement officials to use the RICO law to combat alien 
smuggling operations.‖  Id. at *9.  The action was necessary 
because ―[o]rganized crime rings in this country, with ties to 
others abroad, have developed to prey upon illegal 
immigrants who want to come to the United States.‖  141 
Cong. Rec. H1588 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1995) (statement of 
Rep. McCollum); see also Bobb v. Att’y. Gen., 458 F.3d 213, 
221 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that AEDPA targeted ―[m]any of 
the crimes . . . committed by persons involved in organized 
immigration crime[,] . . . includ[ing] . . . alien smuggling . . . 
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[and] trafficking in immigration and other documents . . . .‖) 
(citing H.R. Rep. 104-22, at *7); Sys. Mgmt., Inc., v. Loiselle, 
91 F. Supp. 2d 401, 408-09 (D. Mass. 2000) (―(Section 274 of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act) bears the title ‗Bringing 
in and harboring certain aliens.‘  It thus seems targeted 
against individuals who smuggle, conceal, or transport illegal 
aliens into the United States.‖)).  
II. 
In dressing this landlord-tenant dispute as a federal 
RICO claim and seeking treble damages, this plaintiff has 
joined countless others who have fashioned such claims out 
of disputes that have nothing whatever to do with subverting 
crime rings or criminal syndicates.  Rather, we are here 
confronted with an everyday landlord-tenant dispute adorned 
as a racketeering claim complete with the obligatory treble 
damage request that is both the sine qua non and irresistible 
impulse of so many civil actions under RICO.   
In Sedima, the Supreme Court warned: ―in its private 
civil version, RICO is evolving into something quite different 
from the original conception of its enactors.‖  473 U.S. at 500 
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(citation omitted).  This has occurred even though the 
congressional intent underlying RICO could not be clearer.  
Both the Act‘s title and the legislative history demonstrate 
that Congress passed the statute to target organized crime.  Id. 
at 524 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also H.J. Inc. v. 
Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 248 (1989) (―The 
occasion for Congress‘ action [in enacting RICO] was the 
perceived need to combat organized crime.‖).  Congress 
therefore crafted the broad list of predicate offenses that 
trigger a RICO violation in order to create a weapon with 
sufficient flexibility to be effective in extricating society from 
the insidious tentacles of organized crime and all of its 
continually evolving mechanisms of infiltration and 
corruption.  As we explained in United States v. Bergrin, 650 
F.3d 257, 270-71 (3d Cir. 2011): 
 Congress intended for RICO to apply to 
individuals who, through involvement in an 
enterprise, commit any combination of the 
many and diverse predicate acts, whether the 
usual organized crime-type offenses (e.g., 
bribery, extortion, gambling), more violent 
crimes (e.g., murder, kidnapping), or more 
niche crimes (e.g., counterfeiting music or 
trafficking in illicit prescription drugs).  
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The broad array of crimes that Congress selected as RICO 
predicate offenses are thus intended to function as ―hidden 
treasures—or buried landmines—‖ that can be exploited by 
creative counsel in an appropriate case.
2
  
However, the very strength of RICO—its breadth—
now diffuses its focus.  RICO‘s treble damage provision has 
been seized upon to convert the statute into a hodgepodge of 
prohibitions that now function as a tripwire that offers the 
lure of treble recovery to all who can squeeze their claim into 
some combination of RICO‘s ―predicate acts.‖  The civil 
penalties in RICO have thus been transformed into a fulcrum 
that is used to pry treble damages out of causes of action 
originating in ―divorce, trespass, legal and accounting 
malpractice, inheritance among family members, employment 
benefits and sexual harassment by a union.‖  William H. 
Rehnquist, Chief Justice of the United States, Remarks of the 
Chief Justice, Address Before the Eleventh Seminar on the 
Administration of Justice (Apr. 7, 1989),  in 21 St. Mary‘s 
L.J. 5, 11 (1989).  In fact, ―[m]ost of the civil suits filed under 
the statute have nothing to do with organized crime[;]  [t]hey 
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 Batista, supra, § 3.15. 
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are garden-variety civil fraud cases of the type traditionally 
litigated in state courts.‖  Id. at 9. 
In Sedima, the Court mentioned in a footnote that an 
ABA Task Force on RICO had ―found that of the 270 known 
civil RICO cases at the trial court level [at that time], 40% 
involved securities fraud, 37% common-law fraud in a 
commercial or business setting, and only 9% [involved] 
‗allegations of criminal activity of a type generally associated 
with professional criminals.‘ ‖ 473 U.S. at 500 n.16.  
Similarly, ―[a]nother survey of 132 published decisions found 
that 57 involved securities transactions and 38 [involved] 
commercial and contract disputes . . . .‖  Id.  We can now add 
landlord-tenant disputes to the mix.  
In the criminal arena, this proclivity for abuse is at 
least limited by prosecutorial discretion, the risk of losing 
credibility with jurors if the prosecution engages in ―overkill‖ 
or overreaching, and the related risk of jury nullification.  
However, RICO‘s civil remedy is not restricted by any such 
10 
 
considerations.
3
  Thus, it is not surprising that we are today 
faced with a claim that this landlord-tenant dispute is really a 
racketeering conspiracy that should entitle this tenant to treble 
damages under RICO.
4
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 See Rehnquist, Remarks, supra, at 10 (―[T]here is no such 
thing as prosecutorial discretion to limit the use of civil RICO 
by plaintiffs‘ attorneys.‖).   
 Even though one could argue that jury nullification 
plays a role in deterring abuse in the civil arena as well, 
common sense would suggest that the very different 
dynamics that are at work there make jury nullification or fear 
of overreaching far less important to determining how to 
structure a civil suit when jurors know ―it‘s only money.‖  
Moreover, strategic considerations such as settlement posture 
may play a far more important role in deciding how to draft a 
civil complaint than concerns about overreaching or jury 
nullification. 
4
  I do not suggest that landlord-tenant disputes and 
organized crime are necessarily mutually exclusive.  The 
legislative history of RICO illustrates that organized crime is 
more than capable of injecting its poisonous proboscis into 
almost any ―enterprise,‖ including the business of renting 
property.  See e.g., Swistock v. Jones, 884 F.2d 755, 759 (3d 
Cir. 1989) (reversing district court dismissal of RICO claim 
of inducing plaintiffs to enter into a lease and make payments 
under the lease); Charron v. Pinnacle Grp. N.Y. LLC, 269 
F.R.D. 221, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (―Defendants are correct 
that there is an aspect of this case that implicates 
individualized landlord-tenant disputes.  But each landlord-
tenant dispute is, according to Plaintiffs, more than just that; 
it is one of the hundreds, if not thousands, of pixels forming 
something larger, more uniform, and far more serious—a 
pattern of racketeering actionable under RICO.  This is, in 
short, a RICO class action brought in federal district court, 
not a collection of landlord-tenant disputes . . . .‖). 
Furthermore, creative counsel can hardly be faulted for 
resorting to this statute in representing clients as long as the 
11 
 
 
III. 
Some courts have tried to address this problem by 
relying on such traditional concepts as prudential standing.
5
  
                                                                                                     
statute remains as broad as it is now.  See Sedima, 472 U.S. at 
504 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (―[L]itigants, lured by the 
prospect of treble damages and attorney‘s fees, have a strong 
incentive to invoke RICO‘s provisions whenever they can 
allege in good faith‖ two predicate acts from the statute‘s 
substantial list of predicate offenses.); Rehnquist, Remarks, 
supra, at 12 (―RICO‘s treble damages provisions create a 
powerful incentive for attorneys to attempt to bring facts 
traditionally thought to establish other causes of action within 
the ambit of the statute.‖).  Thus, I do not suggest counsel for 
this plaintiff has acted improperly in fashioning this claim as 
a RICO violation.  
5
       Standing involves constitutional, prudential, and often 
statutory limitations on who may bring a claim in federal 
court.  Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984); see also 
The Pitt News v. Fisher, 215 F.3d 354, 359 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
The constitutional component [of standing], 
derived from the Art. III case or controversy 
requirement, requires a plaintiff to demonstrate 
that he or she suffered injury in fact, that the 
injury is fairly traceable to the actions of the 
defendant, and that the injury will likely be 
redressed by a favorable decision. 
* * * 
Under certain circumstances, prudential, 
as opposed to constitutional, standing 
considerations limit a plaintiff‘s ability to bring 
suit. These prudential considerations are a set of 
judge-made rules forming an integral part of 
judicial self-government. The aim of this form 
of judicial self-governance is to determine 
12 
 
One such effort involved requiring plaintiffs to establish 
―RICO standing‖ just as antitrust standing is required of a 
plaintiff suing for an antitrust violation under the Clayton 
Act.  See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 485.  The Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit used that approach in Sedima in upholding 
the District Court‘s dismissal of the civil RICO action there.  
The Court of Appeals reasoned that a RICO plaintiff must 
allege a separate ―RICO injury‖ ―just as an antitrust plaintiff 
must allege an ‗antitrust injury.‘‖ Id.  The Court of Appeals 
had imposed that requirement based on the legislative history 
and the strong congressional concern with providing 
additional tools against organized crime that lead to RICO‘s 
enactment.  Id. at 494.
6
  
                                                                                                     
whether the plaintiff is a proper party to invoke 
judicial resolution of the dispute and the 
exercise of the court‘s remedial powers. 
 
Conte Bros. Auto., Inc. v. Quaker State –Slick 50, Inc., 165 
F.3d 221, 225  (3d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). 
6
  The Supreme Court noted that: ―[i]n summarizing the bill 
[that became RICO] on the House floor, its sponsor described 
the treble damages provision as ‗another example of the 
antitrust remedy being adapted for use against organized 
criminality.‘ ‖ Sedima, 487 U.S. at 487 (citing 116 Cong. 
Rec. 35295 (1970)) (statement of Rep. Poff).  The Senate did 
not object to the inclusion of treble damages because, as the 
Senate sponsor noted, it ―would be ‗a major new tool in 
13 
 
        The Supreme Court rejected that reasoning.  In 
reviewing the legislative history of RICO, the Court noted 
that the treble damages provision was added to ―enhance the 
effectiveness of [the Act‘s prohibitions].‖  Id. at 487 (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted).  The Court observed 
that several courts had struggled to define ―racketeering 
injury,‖ but the Court concluded: ―the difficulty of that task 
itself cautions against imposing such a requirement.‖  Id. at 
494 (footnote omitted).  The Court explained:  
[g]iven that ―racketeering activity‖ [under 
the Act] consists of no more and no less than 
commission of a predicate act, § 1961(1), 
we are initially doubtful about a requirement 
of a ―racketeering injury‖ separate from the 
harm from the predicate acts.  A reading of 
the statute belies any such requirement . . .. 
If the defendant engages in a pattern of 
racketeering activity in a manner forbidden 
by these provisions, and the racketeering 
activities injure the plaintiff in his[/her] 
business or property, the plaintiff has a 
claim under § 1964(c).  There is no room in 
the statutory language for an additional, 
amorphous ―racketeering injury‖ 
requirement. 
 
                                                                                                     
extirpating the baneful influence of organized crime in our 
economic life.‘ ‖ Sedima, 487 U.S. at 488 (citing 116 Cong. 
Rec. at 25190) (statement of Senator McClellan). 
14 
 
Sedima, 487 U.S. at 495 (footnote omitted).
7
  Thus, the Court 
instructed, ―RICO is to be read broadly.‖  Id. at 497.  
 Yet, despite rejecting a requirement of ―RICO 
standing,‖ in Sedima, the Court nevertheless requires an 
injury sufficiently related to the alleged racketeering activity 
to justify allowing a treble damage claim to proceed under 
RICO.  See Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451 
(2006); Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258 
(1992).  The plaintiff in Anza, brought a RICO action against 
a business competitor alleging that the latter had filed 
fraudulent tax returns with the state in order to reduce the 
amount of sales tax accruing from sales.  Anza, 547 U.S. at 
454.  With a reduced tax burden, the defendant could obtain a 
competitive advantage by selling its products at a lower price 
than the plaintiff who had to factor sales tax into the price it 
charged its customers.  Id.  The plaintiff alleged that the 
requisite predicate acts for RICO consisted of mail or wire 
                                              
7
 The Court considered, but rejected any contention that 
Congress did not understand the implications of the treble 
damages provision.  The Court reasoned that the provision 
was not enacted unnoticed and concluded that the statute‘s 
silence on the import of the provision was irrelevant because 
―congressional silence, no matter how ‗clanging,‘ cannot 
override the words of the statute.‖ Sedima, 473 U.S. at 495 
n.13. 
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fraud depending on whether the fraudulent returns were 
mailed or filed electronically.  Id.      
The Supreme Court rejected the claim because the 
alleged injury was too remote from the alleged racketeering 
activity.  Id. at 457-58.  The direct victim of the predicate acts 
was the taxing authority, not the plaintiff.   Id.  Although 
plaintiff would not have suffered its injury ―but for‖ the 
alleged racketeering activity, the defendant‘s lower prices 
proximately caused any business injury to plaintiff, not the 
alleged fraud.  Id. at 458-59.   
Although the Court‘s approach was consistent with a 
prudential standing analysis, the Court did not even mention 
standing in its discussion except to refer to the district court‘s 
reasoning.  Rather, the Court relied on Sedima to explain that 
the ―harm caused by predicate acts‖ must have a direct 
relationship to the alleged injury.  Id. at 457 (citing Sedima, 
473 U.S. at 497).  The Court reiterated: ―the essence of the 
[RICO] violation is the commission of those acts in 
connection with the conduct of an enterprise.‖  Id.  (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Although the injury in Sedima was 
established by alleging an injury ―by reason of‖ the alleged 
racketeering activity, the injury in Anza was too attenuated 
16 
 
from that activity to justify a RICO claim even though the 
plaintiff would not have suffered injury ―but for‖ the 
racketeering activity.  Anza, 547 U.S. at 457-59. 
 The Court was also concerned that the plaintiff‘s lost 
sales could have resulted from any number of factors ―other 
than [defendant‘s] alleged acts of fraud.‖  Id.  The Court 
reasoned that it would be extraordinarily difficult to properly 
apportion damages among the various factors that may have 
contributed to plaintiff‘s lost sales that were in addition to the 
defendant‘s lower prices.  Id. 
  The analysis in Anza was foreshadowed by the Court‘s 
prior decision in Holmes. There, the Court had explained the 
practical and jurisprudential necessity of ensuring that alleged 
injuries were not too remote from the alleged racketeering 
acts to establish proximate cause for the plaintiff‘s injuries.  
503 U.S. at 268-69.  The analysis in Anza flowed directly 
from the need to establish causation.  The majority decision in 
Holmes did not mention prudential standing either, and the 
Court only referred to ―standing‖ tangentially.  See 503 U.S. 
at 263, 264, 270.   
Whether the analysis focuses on the nexus between the 
alleged injury and the alleged racketeering activity through 
17 
 
the lens of proximate cause or through the lens of prudential 
standing, the only limitation on treble damage claims appears 
to be ensuring that the claimed injury is not too remote from 
the alleged predicate acts.
8
  Thus, in Allegheny General 
Hospital v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429 (3d Cir. 2000), 
we focused our inquiry on the nexus between predicate acts 
and injury.  We there upheld the dismissal of various RICO 
claims brought by hospitals to recover unreimbursed medical 
expenses allegedly resulting from the defendant cigarette 
companies‘ fraudulent claims about tobacco use and their 
alleged manipulation of nicotine content of cigarettes.  Id. at 
443-45.  We relied upon our earlier decision in the ―closely 
analogous‖ case of Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare 
Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 1999).  In 
the latter case, union welfare funds had asserted similar 
claims under RICO.  228 F.3d at 435.  We explained in 
Allegheny that the plaintiffs‘ standing depended on 
―[w]hether . . . the alleged conspiracy proximately caused [the 
plaintiffs‘] injuries.‖  Id. 
                                              
8
 ―The Supreme Court has explained that the injury and 
causation requirements of § 1964(c) are aspects of RICO 
standing.‖  In re Sunrise Sec. Lit., 916 F.2d 874, 878-89 (3d 
Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). 
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       More recently, in Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York, 
130 S. Ct. 983 (2010), the Supreme Court specifically 
rejected a ―but for‖ test of causation and reiterated that the 
RICO injury must be ―by reason of‖ the alleged RICO 
violation.  Id. at 989; a concept that leads to a proximate 
cause analysis.  That decision also focused on proximate 
cause under RICO rather than on prudential standing.  The 
Court explained that ―proximate cause for RICO purposes . . . 
should be evaluated in light of its common-law foundations; 
proximate cause thus requires some direct relation between 
the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.  A link 
that is too remote, purely contingent, or indirec[t] is 
insufficient.  Id. at 989 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).
9
   
                                              
9
 In Hemi Group, the City of New York brought a RICO 
claim against an out of state retailer who sold cigarettes over 
the internet to New York City residents without disclosing the 
names of the buyers to the taxing authorities in New York 
City as required by federal law.  The taxing authorities would 
have used that information to collect the sales tax on the 
cigarettes that would otherwise go uncollected.  The Court 
held that any economic injury the City may have suffered by 
the allegedly fraudulent conduct was not ―by reason of‖ the 
alleged predicate acts because any failure to disclose was 
simply too remote to be the proximate cause of the City‘s 
injury.  130 S. Ct. at 988-89. 
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 It nevertheless remains true under Sedima that all a 
plaintiff must allege to survive a motion to dismiss a claim for 
treble damages under RICO is that his/her injury occurred ―by 
reason of‖ the alleged predicate acts.  See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 
497 (―Any recoverable damages occurring by reason of a 
violation of § 1962(c) will flow from the commission of the 
predicate acts.‖) (footnote omitted).  As I have explained, that 
hurdle is easily cleared in a multitude of actions that have 
nothing to do with organized crime in any of its many 
nefarious manifestations.  For example, if the plaintiff here 
had been able to allege acts that amounted to actual 
―harboring‖ of  aliens, his RICO claim would have survived a 
motion to dismiss even though there is absolutely nothing 
here to suggest a criminal organization is involved in the 
landlord‘s alleged neglect.  
IV. 
Yet, as the Supreme Court has explained, the misuse of 
the statute cannot be traced to any ambiguity in the statutory 
text that would allow for a judicial remedy by reading the 
statute in a manner that more closely reflects congressional 
intent.  ―The preeminent canon of statutory interpretation 
requires us to presume that the legislature says in a statute 
20 
 
what it means and means in a statute what it says there.‖ 
BedRoc Ltd., v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 184 (2004) 
(internal quotation marks and bracket omitted). ―[T]he fact 
that RICO has been applied in situations not expressly 
anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity.  It 
demonstrates breadth.‖ Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499 (citation 
omitted).  Thus, it remains true that: 
private civil actions under the statute are being 
brought almost solely against [businesses not 
implicated in organized crime], rather than 
against the archetypal, intimidating mobster.  
Yet this defect—if defect it is—is inherent in 
the statute as written, and its correction must lie 
with Congress. It is not for the judiciary to 
eliminate the private action in situations where 
Congress has provided it simply because 
plaintiffs are not taking advantage of it in its 
more difficult applications. 
 
Id. at 499-500 (footnote omitted).   
Given the very legitimate and widespread concerns 
about how the treble damage provision of RICO is pushing 
RICO far beyond the parameters Congress intended, I join the 
chorus expressing the need for Congress to revisit this very 
important statute.
10
  With reform, it can yet be honed into a 
                                              
10
 See, e.g., Ideal Steel Supply Corp. v. Anza, 652 F.3d 310, 
328 (2d Cir. 2011) (Cabranes, J., dissenting) (―We encounter 
here another chapter in the long saga of civil RICO and its 
discontents.  Since its enactment in 1970, the civil RICO 
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tool that will continue to be effective in remedying the havoc 
wreaked by organized crime while being less susceptible to 
being the remedy of choice whenever it appears that a 
defendant‘s transgressions can be recast as racketeering 
predicates.  
Congress has, in fact, recognized that a problem exists 
with RICO in its current form.  See RICO Amendments Act 
of 1991, H.R. Rep. No. 102-312 (1991), 1991 WL 243408 at 
*6-8; Rehnquist, Remarks, supra, at 12.  Three possible 
reforms have been suggested:  ―[t]o amend the basic criminal 
law; to make civil RICO unavailable or more difficult to use 
                                                                                                     
statute, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968, has exasperated generations of 
federal judges and practitioners and generated a vast, and 
often skeptical, literature‖); Rehnquist, Remarks, supra,  at 13 
(―I think that the time has arrived for Congress to enact 
amendments to civil RICO to limit its scope to the sort of 
wrongs that are connected to organized crime, or have some 
other reason for being in federal court‖); William H. 
Rehnquist, Get Rico Cases Out of My Courtroom, Wall St. J., 
May 19, 1989, at A14; David B. Sentelle, Civil RICO: The 
Judges’ Perspective, and Some Notes on Practice for North 
Carolina Lawyers, 12 Campbell L. Rev. 145, 148 (1990) 
(―[E]very single district judge with whom I have discussed 
the subject (and I‘m talking in the dozens of district judges 
from across the country) echoes the entreaty expressed in the 
Chief Justice‘s title in The Wall Street Journal.‖)); see also 
Rehnquist, Remarks, supra, at 13 (―Each of the three 
branches—through court opinions, legislative proposals, or 
submissions to Congress—has recently expressed recognition 
of the need for reforming civil RICO.‖). 
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for numerous categories of offenses covered by criminal 
RICO; or to make changes to civil RICO which attempt to 
emulate the results attained by prosecutorial discretion in the 
criminal RICO area.‖  Id. at *7.11   
Although none of those approaches has yet been 
adopted into law, I continue to hope that Congress will 
address the problems that have become apparent in the statute 
as it is now written.  It is for that reason alone that I write; 
nothing else needs to be added to the majority opinion. 
                                              
11
 ―Some individuals have even suggested that in view of 
RICO‘s treble damages provisions, the statute should be 
amended to allow for equally generous sanctions for frivolous 
claims.‖  Id. at 12.  I take no position on specific proposals, 
but encourage Congress to be as creative in its solutions as 
litigants have been in their use of the statute. 
